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PRODUCTION OR CONSUMPTION? 
DISENTANGLING THE SKILL-AGGLOMERATION CONNECTION 






To explain the concentration of human capital in cities, urban theory conjectures that 
the metropolitan scale provides two sources of returns for the more educated: production 
benefits, both in terms of wages and non-monetary gains, and consumption benefits. By 
exploiting a unique survey on Italian workers that records information for the two sources of 
returns, this paper quantifies their respective roles. The findings show that skilled workers 
enjoy higher consumption amenities in larger cities. They benefit from the local public 
goods, such as transportation, health and schooling services, the shopping possibilities, and 
the cultural consumption potentials made possible by the urban location of cinemas, theaters, 
and museums. On the other hand, the more educated do not receive benefits on the 
production side. Their wages do not reflect a premium, and the returns to education and 
experience are not higher than elsewhere. Moreover, urban skilled workers do not change 
jobs more readily than elsewhere and do not appear to be more satisfied of their jobs. The 
estimates imply that in the largest metropolitan areas the value of the consumption amenities 
can be as high as 50% of the rents or 16-17% of the wages. 
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The distribution of human capital is geographically uneven. Urban areas tend to have a 
better educated workforce than rural areas. To explain the skill-agglomeration connection 
theory has suggested various mechanisms. If cities speed the flow of information (Lucas 
(1988)), this can be more valuable to individuals who have high human capital. Urban areas 
may also offer other labor market advantages, in terms of better matches or lower 
unemployment risk (Glaeser (1998)). Alternatively, cities may be centers of consumption 
(Glaeser et al (2001)), which cater to the rich.  
To aim of this paper is to gauge the respective roles of these explanations. To do this, I 
exploit a unique dataset on Italian workers, which provides information on both production– 
and consumption–related urban benefits. On the production side, the data allow me to 
investigate – besides the wage benefits (Glaeser and Maré (2001)) –, the non-wage 
advantages of urban agglomeration (Rosenthal and Strange (2004)) both in terms of mobility 
across occupations and job quality. On the consumption side, I analyze individual 
evaluations of the local quality of life, which according to Shapiro (2003) and Tabuchi and 
Yoshida (2000) is a key source of agglomeration.  Moreover, I study the role played by the 
elementary components (such as public goods, pollution, or cultural amenities) of the quality 
of life at the local level. 
The findings show that the skill-agglomeration connection is mainly explained in 
terms of consumption benefits. Skilled workers enjoy higher amenities in larger cities. In 
particular, they seem to enjoy the local public goods – such as transportation, health and 
schooling services –, the shopping possibilities and the cultural consumption potentials made 
possible by the urban location of cinemas, theaters, and museums. On the other hand, the 
more educated do not seem to receive benefits on the production side. Their wages do not 
reflect a premium, and the returns to education and experience do not seem to be higher than 
elsewhere. Moreover, there is no evidence of non-wage benefits. Urban skilled workers do 
not change jobs more readily than elsewhere. In addition, they do not appear to be more 
                                                            
1    I thank Luigi Cannari and Massimo Omiccioli for stimulating discussions and participants in the 
European Regional Science Association (Amsterdam 2005), Associazione Italiana degli Economisti del Lavoro 
(Rome 2005), and  two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Diego Caprara for 
the editorial assistance.  
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satisfied of their jobs. I also estimate that the extra rent costs for urban dwellings are 
substantial. The estimates imply that in the largest metropolitan areas the value of the 
consumption amenities for the more skilled can be as high as 50% of the rents or 16-17% of 
the wages. 
In what follows, the next section highlights the relevant theoretical issues. Section 2 
describes the data. The estimation of the urban rent differentials is in Section 3, while the 
production and the consumption urban benefits are the focus respectively of Section 4 and 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theory 
The concept of spatial equilibrium represents an useful guide for the empirical analysis 
of the skill-agglomerations connection. Pioneered by Roback (1982) and popularized in the 
skill-agglomeration literature by Rauch (1993), the concept of spatial equilibrium requires 
individuals be indifferent across locations. Since cities affect both productivity and the 
quality of life (amenity), a spatial equilibrium requires the sum of the two effects be 
capitalized in housing rents. In particular, the following equation must hold in equilibrium: 
(1) Urban Rent Premium = Urban Production Premium + Urban Consumption Premium. 
This equation suggests that the Urban Rent Premium provides an upper limit against to 
which evaluate the benefits for skilled workers deriving from dwelling in a large city. To be 
sure, the Urban Rent Premium is equal to the net benefits, since offsetting productivity and 
amenity effects can be simultaneously at work.
2  
Theory highlights several mechanisms trough which the size of a city can impact on 
the productivity of the more skilled. Traditional urban theory stresses factors such as better 
access to specialized inputs and lower transportation costs for suppliers and customers, 
which may not have a skill bias. However, the human capital externalities explanations   
pioneered by Lucas (1988), Rauch (1993) and Ciccone and Hall (1996) suggest that the more 
educated workers may benefit more from urban areas because the more educated are better 
                                                            
2  For instance, the view that cities are characterized by agglomeration economies in production and 




able to learn from others.
3 While the Urban Productivity Premium is commonly measured 
with wages (Glaeser and Maré (2001)), worker benefits do not need to be limited to 
compensations. In particular, workers should be better matched in large cities (Rosenthal and 
Strange (2004)). A large number of employers within an urban area enables workers to 
change jobs more easily. This provides advantages for those trying to find the right career for 
themselves, since they can hop jobs at much less cost than elsewhere. A related advantage is 
given by the specialization made it possible by market size. In this vein, Baumgartner (1988) 
shows that physicians perform a narrower range of activities in large markets. To the extent 
that the more educated care more about the quality of their job, better matches can help to 
rationalize the skill-agglomeration connection. For instance, Costa and Kahn (2000) suggest 
that cities offer a resolution to the dual career problem of the college educated couples by 
increasing the probability that  both partners are able to find jobs that are matched to their 
abilities.
4 Furthermore, cities may also offer complementary job opportunities. For instance, 
Glaeser (1998, p. 146) discusses the theater industry in new York and explains that “New 
York’s actors not only have a wide range of different theaters to get  the job, but also have 
numerous other employers outside of the theater industry. Indeed, the aspiring actor working 
in a restaurant is so common that it has became a cliché.”  
In contrast to the more traditional analysis of agglomeration that has focused on the 
ability of cities to enhance productivity, recent work has emphasized the consumption 
possibilities of large cities as source of agglomeration.
5 Do amenity valuations vary for 
skilled and unskilled? To be sure, conventional urban economics (see, for instance, O’ 
Sullivan (2003)) has stressed the disamenities of large metropolitan areas, such as pollution 
and crime. Urban disamenities can hardly explain the crowding of the more educated in large 
cities: even though disamenities affect everyone, there are reason to believe that more 
                                                            
3  More recently, this point has been questioned: Ciccone and Peri (2002) and Moretti (2003) argue that 
the effect of human capital externalities is more pronounced for the relatively unskilled, whose wages, in 
addition to the externalities,  benefit also from imperfect substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor. 
4  This argument is however contended by Compton and Pollak (2004), who show that all college 
educated, married and unmarried, are attracted to the amenities and high returns to education found in large 
cities and that, as a result, the formation of power couples is more likely to occur in large cities. 
5  The importance of consumption as source of agglomeration has also been the focus of the papers by 
Glaeser and Saiz (2003), Shapiro (2003), and Tabuchi and Yoshida  (2000), which are based however on the 
comparison between rents and wages (either in levels  or growth rates) and therefore do not consider non-wage 
urban benefits. Adamson et al (2004) show that returns to education for the skilled decline with the urban scale, 
and interpret this finding as implying that urban amenities affect primarily skilled workers.  
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educated workers dislike disamenities relatively more than less educated counterparts. 
Recent papers have however argued that large cities enhance consumption. By looking at the 
radio listening patterns and newspaper purchases, Waldfogel (2003) and George and 
Waldfogel (2003) show that large markets allow goods to be tailored to the consumers’ 
preferences. Glaeser et al (2001) argue that there are four ways in which city size affect 
consumption. First, there could be goods and services, such as opera and restaurants, which  
are available in  large cities and not available elsewhere. Second, large cities may offer 
aesthetic and physical attractions, such as architecture or climate.  Third, large cities may 
allow the provision of public goods that would not be possible in a smaller place (for 
instance, specialized schools). Fourth, large cities allow social interactions that that would 
not be possible in a smaller city. Again, it is important to note that these amenities are likely 
to be normal (or even luxury) goods. Thus, high-human capital individuals are likely have a 
stronger preference for them (see, also, Brueckner et al (1999)). 
3. Data 
Our main data source is the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). This 
survey is conduced every two years by the Bank of Italy on a representative sample of about 
8,000 households: see Brandolini and Cannari (1994) for details.
6 The SHIW collects 
detailed information on Italian households. For each member of the family, it gathers data on 
demographic features and economic behavior including wage, age, sex, marital status, work 
status, schooling, work history, and employer’s branch of activity. Moreover, at the 
household level, the survey collects data on dwellings, including both the main family’s 
house of residence and other property owned. For each dwelling, the SHIW collects several 
characteristics: rent, surface, location, year of construction, and additional information such 
as number of bathrooms and presence of a heating system. Since from 1993 the SHIW has 
maintained the same structure, I pool data from the last four waves (1993, 1995, 1998, and 
2000). The details of the variables used in the paper are reported in the Appendix 1. The 
dataset includes 27,931 dwelling’s observations and 23,371 wage and salary worker’s 
                                                            
6  SHIW micro-data are publicly available at www.bancaditalia.it. Occasionally, I use variables that for 
confidentiality reasons are made available only to the staff of the Bank of Italy. When used, these variables are 
explicitly flagged in the text.    
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observations (the sample is restricted to workers of age between 15 and 65). Table 1 gives 
the means and standard deviations for the variables used in the paper. 
An important feature of the SHIW is the fact that the standard information on 
demographic and economic aspects, which are recorded regularly every wave and are similar 
to those collected by other surveys such as the American PSID or CPS, are supplemented by 
special sections. These sections gather subjective data on aspects that are somewhat less 
ordinary in conventional economic surveys (such as, individual expectations or cultural 
preferences).
7 Below, I exploit the 1995 special section on job satisfaction and the 1993 
special section on the local quality of life. 
Dwellings and workers are distributed over 380 cities. The measure for city size made 
available by the SHIW is a categorical variable that provides a division of municipalities by 
resident population in five groups: Villages (up to 5,000 inhabitants); Large Villages (from 
5,000 to 20,000 inhabitants); Small MAs (from 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants); Midsize MAs 
(from 50,000 to 200,000 inhabitants); and Large MAs (more than 200,000 inhabitants). In 
the regressions below the categorical variable for city size is transformed in a series of 
dummies, one for each category, where the omitted dummy corresponds to the Village 
group. Appendix 2 reports the names of the cities included in the sample for the two largest 
groups of Midsize and Large MAs. All regressions are based on appropriate weighted data.
8 
While the skill-agglomeration connection is well documented phenomena for many 
countries,  its extent in the Italian case is quite striking.
9 As shown in Fig. 1 for the SHIW 
sample of workers, the college share (% of workers with a college degree or more) increase 
rapidly with city size. It rises from 5% in Villages and Large Villages to 20% in Large MAs. 
                                                            
7  The special sections are considered to be quite demanding for the respondents and very expensive for 
the Bank of Italy. This explains why special sections are not recurrent and are usually posed only to a subset of 
the respondents. 
8  Our coefficient estimates however are not sensitive to weighting or not weighting the data. 
9  According to the evidence summarized by Adamson et al (2004), high-school share and college share in 




Similarly, the high school share (% of workers with an high school diploma and less than a 
college degree) increases from 40% to 44%.
10  
4. Rents 
I start by estimating the Urban Rent Premium that provides a measure of the overall  
net magnitude of productivity and amenity benefits. Column 1 of Table 2 reports the effects 
of city size on house rents controlling for nothing than time dummies. The dependent 
variable is the log of annual rents.
11 This regression suggests that raw differences in house 
rents are quite pronounced. Compared to Villages, rents are 26% higher in Midsize MAs and 
45% higher in Large MAs.  
Clearly, the heterogeneity in house characteristics across cities is what might drive the 
observed raw differences. To control for observable house features, Column 2 includes a 
number of standard regressors (see, for instance, Berger et al. (2003) or Gyourko et al. 
(1999)): the surface area and the age of the dwelling, and dummies for the presence of two 
bathrooms and heating system. The regression also includes a set of dummies for the 
location of the dwelling within the city. The SHIW classifies location by six categories: 
isolated area, countryside; town outskirts, between outskirts and town center, town center, 
other, hamlet. Finally, a dummy for families residing in the south of Italy is included.
12 The 
                                                            
10  In principle, cohort composition effects might be the cause of the concentration of skilled workers in the 
Italian cities. The Italian population is characterized by a long-run trend of increasing education, since the 
younger cohorts are better-educated than the older ones. Therefore, to the extent that younger cohorts are more 
urbanized, the concentration of human capital in cities could be only the consequence of a younger urban 
workforce. However, this does not happen to be the case. By limiting the sample to younger workers (identified 
as those with age less than 40), I find that the high-school share and the college share increase respectively 
from 46% and 5% in Villages to 50% and 18% in Large MAs. Another concern is related to the role of the 
government. Alesina et al. (2001) argue that public employment in Italy is used mainly as redistribution device 
and that this distorts the functioning of the labor market. In particular, since public jobs are more attractive than 
private sector jobs, educational choices are tilted toward the public sector. In this vein, the concentration of 
human capital in large cities can be explained by the fact that these areas are predominantly home of 
government headquarters, both at the central and local level. The data, however, do not support the idea that the 
government employment explains the skill-agglomeration connection. For instance, by limiting the wage and 
salary sample to private sector workers, I find that the human capital concentration is even more evident: high-
school and college shares are respectively equal to 35% and 2% in Villages and to 44% and 12% Large MAs.  
11  The interviewed can be either the property owner or the tenant.  In the first case, the SHIW collects the 
rent the owner charges (or, if the dwelling is not rented or it is the family residence, her best estimate for the 
rent she could charge). In the second case, the tenant reports the actual rent. 
12  As well known, the south of Italy differs from the center-northern territories in a number of respects: the 
south is generally poorer and less endowed with infrastructures. The south has also lower quality of local  
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effects of these variables on rents are as expected: rents are higher for larger and newer 
houses and for dwellings endowed with more than one bathroom and heating system. 
Location dummies enter with high significance: compared with dwellings located in the 
countryside, rents for the houses in the town center are 27 percent higher (point estimates not 
reported in the table). The south dummy is associated with a 30% discount on rents. As for 
the coefficients of interest, I find that by controlling for observed house features the 
differences in rents across cities of different size are magnified. Urban rent premium are now 
equal to 29% for Midsize MAs and 50% for Large MAs. 
Unobservable house and neighborhood characteristics might bias these estimates. For 
instance, larger cities might display higher house quality even after controlling for surface, 
age, bathrooms and heating. Similarly, larger cities might have suburbs of superior quality. 
To make a first cut at this issue, note that in the SHIW the interviewed is asked to provide 
her own evaluation regarding the quality of both the house and its location. In the first case, 
she has to answer to the question “How do you rate this dwelling” by picking one of the 
following answers: luxury, upscale, mid-range, modest, low-income, very-low income. In 
the second case, the question is “How do you rate the area in which this dwelling is 
located?” and the potential answers are recorded respectively as: upscale, run-down, neither 
upscale or run-down, other. The two subjective measures are clearly correlated with the 
observable characteristics of the houses and their location, which represent our standard 
controls in Column 2. This implies that their inclusion will reduce the coefficients on the 
observables. However, the two individual ratings are also likely to be correlated with 
unobservable house and location characteristics. Thus, the inclusion of the two subjective 
ratings can provide a robustness check for the effect of city size with respects to these 
unobservable features. Adding the two subjective ratings (Column 3) increases the 
explanatory power of the regression from 39% to 49%. As expected, the two ratings are 
highly significant and their inclusion reduces the estimated effects of the observables. More 
importantly, however, the change in the coefficients for the city size is very small
13. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
institutions and property right protection. To make sure that city size dummies are not just picking up 
differences between center-north and south of Italy, I control for the southern location of the dwellings. 
13  The inclusion of subjective house ratings reduces the rent samples respectively to 27,904 observations. 
As I checked, this reduction is not relevant for the results obtained before.  
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Summing up, the Urban Rent Premium is rapidly increasing in the size of the city. 
Residents of Midsize and Large MAs pay extra rents of respectively 30% and 50% more. 
Next task will be to find what are the advantages of larger cities for the more educated that 
compensate for these extra costs. 
5. Production 
As underscored in the theoretical section, urbanization economies may impact on both 
monetary and non-monetary aspects of the employment relationship.  Below, we consider 
the two potential source of urban benefits in turn. 
5.1  Wages 
In their seminal contribution, Glaeser and Maré (2001) find that workers in cities earn 
a substantial premium (33%) over their non-urban counterparts. How much is the urban 
premium for the Italian workers? Is being in a city more valuable for the more educated? The 
estimation procedure involves no more than estimating versions of the basic wage equation. 
Table 3 presents the results for individual log earning (hourly wage rate) as the dependent 
variable. In the Column 1, I start by showing that there are raw wage variations among 
residents of differently sized cities. The wage premium for Midsize and Large MAs amount 
respectively to 9% and 15%.  
  Next, I check to what extent raw differences are due to observed differences in 
workers’ attributes. The specification in Column 2 includes the standard Mincerian set of 
individual characteristics: labor market experience,
14 its squared value, number of years of 
schooling, and two dummies for sex and marital status. Similarly to the rent-equation, the 
specification includes also a dummy for workers residing in the south. The results are in line 
with what is usually obtained in this kind of exercise (for previous studies based on the 
SHIW: see Cannari and D’Alessio (1995) and Colussi (1997)). I find that high-school 
                                                            
14  The measure of work experience is calculated as the difference between worker’s age at the survey date 
and the age when the first job was taken. Thus, this measure of experience is more accurate than the most 
widely used measure of seniority (Experience = Age - Years of Schooling – 6), which attributes “waiting 
unemployment” after school to work experience. Workers who did not report their age when taking the first job 
are therefore dropped from the sample.  
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diplomats and college graduates earn respectively 45.7% and 81.4% more than workers with 
at most an elementary school qualification. Experience increases wages up to 40 years of 
experience. Wages of women are 8.7 percent lower than men’s wages. Married workers 
enjoy an 8.1 percent premium.
15 Southern workers suffer from a 8.8 percent discount. 
Crucially, by controlling for workers’ attributes the effect of city size on wages vanishes: 
none of the city size dummies remains significant. This suggests that the raw urban wage 
differentials are entirely explained by observable differences in workers characteristics 
among cities of different size. 
To be sure, the results in Column 2 underscore that controlling for observable 
characteristics eliminates the average urban wage premium. That is, the premium across 
education levels. It could be still the case that the city size effect is positive for the more 
educated and negative for the less skilled, making the average urban premiums vanishing. To 
check for this possibility, Column 3 allows interaction between metropolitan area residence 
and workers’ observables. I do not present the estimates of the interactions for all the four 
city size groups because of the preponderance of coefficients that this would create. Column 
3 focuses on the interactions of workers’ characteristics with Midsize and Large MAs.
16 I 
find that the interaction terms are never significant. In particular, in the larger urban areas 
high education is not rewarded more than elsewhere (the point estimates for the interactions 
between urban residence and college achievement are even negative). On related grounds, I 
do not find cross effects between work experience and urban status.
17 
Subsequently, I turn to robustness.
18 A first check is related to the inclusion of 
additional sets of individual controls, which refer to the worker’s branch of activity, 
employer’s size and job qualification.
19 In principle, it is debatable whether to include or not 
                                                            
15  A wage premium on marriage status is common in the labor literature. For some alternative explanations 
of this finding see, for example, Korenman and Neumark (1991) and Loh (1996).  
16  The results reported in the text are however nicely confirmed when I allow for interactions with all the 
city size groups.  
17  Glaeser and Maré (2001) find that the urban wage premium increases with experience and interpret this 
result as suggesting that cities make workers more productive. 
18  For the sake of brevity, these set of results are not reported (they are however available on request). 
19 In particular, I include seven industry dummies for eight branches of activity (agriculture; 
manufacturing; building and construction; wholesale and retail trade, lodging and catering services; transport 
and communications; services of credit and insurance institutions; real estate and renting services, other 
professional, business activities; general government and other private and public services). I also add six  
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these controls. On the one hand, these additional controls take care of some of the 
unobservables. On the other hand, to the extent that the additional controls are likely to be 
determined simultaneously with the labor market outcome - their inclusion can lead to an 
underestimation of the true differences among areas (Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002)). In 
any case, I find that controlling for industries, firm sizes, and job qualifications has no effect 
on the estimates of the urban wage premiums.
20 Another concern is the extent to which my 
results are driven by spatial sorting. For instance, the absence of correlation between city 
size and earning could be explained by the fact that workers with worse unobserved abilities 
are more likely to dwell in large cities. To tackle this issue, I use the confidential SHIW data 
on the birthplace of workers. This information is at the level of the 103 Italian Provinces that 
cover the country. While this is certainly not ideal, I should still be able to detect spatial 
sorting through the different outcomes for those who work where they were born (the 
‘stayers’) and the others (the ‘movers’).
21 By including an additional set of controls for 
movers/stayers to the specification reported in Table 3, I find, however, that spatial sorting is 
not an issue. The average urban premium remains non-significant for both groups. Similarly, 
the interactions of workers’ characteristics with Midsize and Large MAs remain non-
significant for both movers and stayers. 
I then check how sensitive are my results to changes in the city size groping. In this 
respect, I first separate the largest cities (Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin, Genoa, and Palermo, 
which have more than 500,000 inhabitants) from the remaining Large MAs. Next, I replace 
the set of dummies for city sizes with the (log) of residing population. Finally, I substitute 
the size of the city with the size of the local labor market area, which is a functional region 
related to its local labor market defined in terms of commuting conditions  (OECD (2002)).
22 
I find that none of these additional checks modifies my results.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
dummies for seven classes of employer’s size (up to 4; from 5 to 19; from 20 to 49; from 50 to 99; from 100 to 
499; 500 or more; not applicable - public-sector employee). Finally, I include three dummies for the individual 
job qualification (for the following four categories: blue-collar worker or similar; office worker or school 
teacher; junior manager cadre; manager, senior official). 
20  This is true irrespectively of the fact that  the additional sets controls are introduced simultaneously or 
one by one. 
21  A similar procedure is followed by Charlot and Duranton (2004). 
22  The log of the residing population is calculated on the basis of the data provided by the Italian National 
Statistical Agency (ISTAT). For the robustness to city size grouping  I have used the municipality code that is 
SHIW confidential information.  
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In conclusion, the idea that the urban scale affects wages does not receive empirical 
support.  More importantly, the idea that the more educated workers benefit more from urban 
areas is not supported by the evidence. 
5.2  Non-wage benefits 
High skilled workers may concentrate in large cities even if the firms located in these 
areas do not pay more. In particular, workers in urban areas can take advantage of the larger 
pool of employers.  
As shown in the theoretical section, a central theme of the agglomeration literature is 
that in urban centers workers can more readily than elsewhere change jobs. Marshall 
suggests that thick labor market insure workers against firm- or industry-specific shocks. I 
investigate this idea by looking at the turnover rate, which is measured in the SHIW by the 
question: “Consider all the activities, including temporary ones, performed in your lifetime: 
how many activities, including the current one, had you performed?”. The regression results 
for the sample of 19,024 wage earners who have responded to this question are reported in 
Table 4. Column 1 shows that the effect of the urban scale on raw turnover rates is quite 
difficult to interpret: when compared to the smallest municipalities, turnover rates are higher 
everywhere else; however, the effect is stronger for either Large Villages or Large MAs. 
Controlling for workers’ observables (Column 2) makes things clearer, since the effect 
increases with the size of the city. Quite interesting, turnover decreases with education. 
Moreover, it is lower for females and southern residents while it is higher for married 
workers.  Turning to cross-effects (Column 3), I find mixed evidence: the number of lifetime 
jobs held by college graduates is higher in Midsize MA but not in Large MA, while city size 
does not matter for those with an high school diploma (I also find that the female negative 
effect and the married worker positive effect on job turnover are substantially reduced in 
larger cities).  
The evidence on turnover can hardly be deemed as decisive. Good matches are less 
prone to termination. Therefore, the fact that workers in urban areas can be better matched 
with their employers might bias downwards the effect of the urban scale on turnover. The 
next step is to evaluate to what extent cities enhance good matches.  
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I start by considering an indirect measure of job quality: tenure (the number of years 
spent with the current employer). This is the variable used by  Glaeser and Maré (1994) to 
proxy for job quality.  In the wage and salary sample the data on tenure are available for 
18,693 individuals. Table 5 reports the regression results. Again, the raw effects (Column 1) 
are meaningless. By controlling for the workers’ observables (Column 2), I find that all city 
size dummies display a negative sign. However, the effect is only significant for Large MAs. 
Turning to Column 3, I note that the interactions between urban status and educational 
attainments are never significant. Clearly, this is evidence against the idea that the urban 
scale affects positively the quality of the matches.
23 
How to evaluate the quality of a worker’s match has traditionally been a mounting 
task. Many of the thinks that make a match a good one are generally not covered in the 
surveys. Besides, the indirect measures fall generally short of capturing the non-monetary 
aspects that might have no relationship with wages but that affect the appeal of the job 
especially for the more educated. In what follows, I take advantage of the detailed 
information on job satisfaction provided by the SHIW in 1995. In this wave, the following 
question was made to 2,809 employed individuals: “Apart from the economic aspects, how 
do you judge the overall satisfaction from your work?” Interviewed were required to provide 
a rating between 1 (lowest) and 5 (highest). Respondents were then asked to provide a finer 
judgment of their job satisfaction according to the following six criteria: environmental 
conditions (physical and social); dangerousness for life or health; effort required; 
interestingness; consideration by others; concern about losing their employment. I show in 
Table 6 the regression results obtained by using the overall job satisfaction index as 
dependent variable. Obviously, these results should be taken cautiously given their 
qualitative nature. However, they show quite unambiguously that the urban scale does not 
seem to affect job satisfaction (while, irrespective of the location, the satisfaction of the more 
educated is higher than those of less educated counterparts). The only statistical significant 
                                                            
23 A  second  indirect measure for job quality is given by the work status. Jobs of better qualities are 
characterized by higher qualifications, which are recorded by the SHIW through the following categories: blue-
collar worker or similar; office worker or school teacher;  junior manager; manger or senior official. However, 
when I probit estimate the effect of city size on a dependent variable that takes on the value of one for the two 
categories of junior manager and manger or senior official, I still find inconclusive evidence (these results are 
available on request). For instance, high school diplomats are penalized by the urban residence. Moreover, 
while I find that college graduates are more likely to have an higher work status in Midsize MAs, I fail to find a 
similar effect for the Large MAs.  
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effect of the urban scale on job satisfaction regards a negative differentials for the urban 
females. I also estimate a single regression for each of the six criteria of judgement, by using 
the same specification as in Table 6, Column (3). The coefficients of interest (dummies for 
Midsize and Large MAs, dummies for High School and College achievements, and their 
interactions) are summarized in Table 7. The results show that college educated living in 
Large MAs seem to be more satisfied as regard to the environmental work conditions and the 
safety of their job. On the other hand, no statistical significant effect materializes for the 
college educated dwelling in  Midsize MAs. Furthermore, the impact of the urban location 
for the high school educated is more puzzling. Those dwelling in a Large MA enjoy jobs that 
are deemed as less dangerous for life or health, but at the same time they are quite 
dissatisfied as regard to the considerations that they receive by others. High school educated 
dwelling in Midsize MAs are even less happy. They still enjoy safer jobs but complain not 
only for the consideration they receive but also  for the environmental job conditions. 
Generally speaking,  these results suggest that non-wage benefits might barely be 
relevant to explain the skill-agglomeration connection. The idea that in urban centers 
workers can change jobs more readily than elsewhere does not receive empirical support. 
Perhaps more importantly, the analysis of both indirect proxy for job quality and direct 
measures of job satisfaction casts some  on the assumption that workers in urban areas are 
better matched with their employers.
24  
6. Consumption 
The empirical investigation carried out so far shows that the substantial Urban Rent 
Premium is not offset by gains on the productivity side. To check whether other sources of 
urban benefits may help to explain the skill-agglomeration connection, I turn now to 
amenities. 
There are many reasons to expect that amenity evaluations vary across locations and 
skill groups. For instance, residents of large urban areas may particularly like cultural 
amenities while residents of non-urban areas may strongly dislike congestion. Within urban 
                                                            
24  I also investigated the relevance of the idea that the dual career problem is less acute in cities (Costa and 
Kahn (2000)). However, the likelihood for College and High school educated partners to be both in 
employment is not  affected by the urban size.    
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areas, certain amenities such as specialized schools or museums may predominantly be 
appreciated by the more skilled. I focus below on direct measures of the quality of life at the 
local level. In the 1993 wave, SHIW respondents were asked to provide their own evaluation 
about a bunch of quality of life determinants. In particular, fifteen quality of life  questions 
were posed to the household heads, who where required to 1) base the answer on both their 
personal experience and the experience of their family members
25 and 2) refer to their 
municipality of residence. The fifteen characteristics of the local quality of life surveyed 
were: Public Transportation, Health Services, Universities, Local Bureaucracy, Traffic 
Congestion, Water Quality, Nursery, Primary and Secondary School, Street Cleaning, Green 
Areas, Safety and Crime Control, Shopping Possibilities, Leisure Activities, Air Pollution, 
Noise Pollution. Respondents chose a number from 1 (lowest satisfaction) to 10 (highest 
satisfaction) for each characteristic. To construct an index for the overall of quality of life, I 
summed (Table 10) the values over 14 out of 15 elementary indexes.
26  The index shows a 
mean value of 76.8, with a standard deviation of 19.4. Results are shown in Table 8. Raw 
differentials (Column 1) indicates a fast worsening of the quality of life with city size. The 
estimated negative impact for Large MAs is twice the negative impact estimated for Small 
MAs or Midsize MAs. However, controlling for individual observables (Column 2) 
decreases the negative effect of the urban scale on the quality of life. Crucially, allowing for 
interactions changes the picture to a large extent. I find that the negative effect is limited to 
the less skilled. In particular, both the High School and the College educated enjoy a 
substantial amenity premium by dwelling in a larger urban center. Interesting, the 
satisfaction of married workers is also positively affected by the urban scale. On the other 
hand, southern workers – who are already relatively  penalized by living in the less 
developed area of the country – experience an additional negative amenity premium.  
                                                            
25  The question was: “On the basis of your personal experience and the experience of your family member 
(please, refer to actual experience and not to what you might have read on newspaper) how would you rate your 
municipality for the following aspects of the quality of life…”.  
26  Since it is constructed by summing the elementary items, the index for the overall quality of life is based 
on the smallest number of respondents across elementary indexes. To avoid an unduly reduction of the number 
of respondents, I excluded from the overall index the evaluations of the local universities, which were provided 
only by 1,694 individuals. The reason why many respondents did not answer to this question is that, even 
though in Italy university infrastructures are quite disperse over the national territory, the number of 
municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants with an university center is extremely low. Therefore, the 
individuals residing in a municipality with no university did not answer to the question. In any case, as I 
checked, results from the overall index that includes the evaluations of the local universities are quite similar to 
those reported in the text.  
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Finally, I turn to the elementary entries of the quality of life. Elementary entries enter 
with equal weights in the index of overall quality of life. This however could be misleading, 
to the extent that some amenities are more important than others in the evaluation across 
skill groups. To tackle this issue, I estimate a single regression for each of the 15 indexes, by 
using the same specification as in Table 8, Column (3). Table 9 reports a selection of the 
coefficients of interest (dummies for Midsize and Large MAs, dummies for High School and 
College achievements, and their interactions). The results suggest that the College educated 
living in Large MAs are particularly satisfied of the local public good services, such as 
transportation, health and schooling services. Moreover, they seem to enjoy to a large extent 
the shopping possibilities offered by a large urban center as well as the cultural consumption 
potentials made it possible by cinemas, theaters, and museums. Quite surprisingly, the 
traditional urban disamenities, such as street cleaning and crime do not seem to bother the 
College educated more than the less educated counterparts. The High School educated show 
a similar pattern. However, they seem to be less happy with the local transportation system 
but more satisfied with the local  nurseries. Again, they do not evaluate street cleaning so 
much and give less importance to the leisure activities. Midsize MAs, are still appreciated by 
the skilled but for somewhat different motives. For instance, for the more educated living 
there the local conditions of the traffic and noise  pollution seem to be much weighted. In 
addition, shopping possibilities seem also important while the cultural consumption 
possibilities appear to matter only for those at the upper end of the skill distribution. 
By and large, the evaluations of the local quality of life of the more educated in the 
larger urban areas support the idea that urban amenities are an important explanation of the 
skill-agglomeration connection. Clearly, since the individual evaluations collected by the 
SHIW are only suggestive, a quantification of their role can be only tentative. In any case, to 
provide a back-of-the-envelop calculation I estimated for the same sample of workers the 
percentage share of rent costs out of the salary. I find that the rents (of the principal 
residence of the household) are approximately equal to 1/3 of the average individual wage. 
Therefore, since the extra rents for Large MAs can be calculated in 50%, and there is no 
Urban Productivity Premium, my guess estimate would be that the value of the consumption 






The concentration of human capital in large cities has long been a longstanding issue 
in urban economics. The related theory has clarified that for the more skilled there could be 
two sources of urban benefits. The first source refer to production. For instance,  human 
capital externality theories stress that more skilled workers may benefit more from urban 
areas because they are better able to learn from others. On related grounds, the labor market 
pooling theories focus on the non-monetary advantages that urban centers provide to the 
more educated, particularly in terms of finding a better match. The second source of urban 
benefits is related to consumption. The urban amenity theories emphasis that cities offer a 
better quality of life, which is likely to be a normal good and thus particularly appreciated by 
workers with more human capital. 
To gauge the respective roles of these explanations, I have used a unique dataset on 
household– and individual–level data for the Italian cities. The dataset provides information 
on both production– and consumption–related urban benefits. In particular, I have exploited 
data on individual evaluations of the job satisfaction and the local quality of life. Moreover,  
to obtain an order of magnitude for the overall net effects, I have used data on dwellings to 
estimate city rents. 
 
The findings show that skilled workers enjoy higher consumption amenities in larger 
cities. In particular, they seem to enjoy the local public goods – such as transportation, health 
and schooling services –, the shopping possibilities and the cultural consumption potentials 
made possible by the urban location of cinemas, theaters, and museums. On the other hand, 
the more educated do not seem to receive benefits on the production side. Their wages do 
not reflect a premium, and the returns to education and experience do not seem to be higher 
than elsewhere. Moreover, there is no evidence of non-wage benefits. Urban workers do not 
change jobs more readily than elsewhere. In addition, they do not appear to be more satisfied 
of their jobs. I also estimate that the extra rent costs for urban dwellings are substantial. The 
estimates imply that in the largest metropolitan areas the value of the consumption amenities 
for the more skilled can be as high as 50% of the rents or 16-17% of the wages.  
 
 
Tables and Figures 
 




 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Obs. 
(Log) Rents  8.712  0.709  27,931 
City Size: Villages  0.101  0.302  27,931 
                 Large Villages  0.156  0.363  27,931 
                 Small MAs  0.298  0.457  27,931 
                 Midsize MAs  0.297  0.458  27,931 
                 Large MAs  0.147  0.354  27,931 
Surface area  103.721  52.144  27,931 
Age of the house  50.206  74.662  27,931 
Bathrooms 0.350  0.484  27,931 
Heating system  0.816  0.387  27,931 
South 0.349  0.477  27,931 
(Log) Wages  2.464  0.406  23,371 
Educational Achievement: Elementary School   0.125  0.330  23,371 
                                            Junior High School  0.325  0.468  23,371 
                                            High School  0.428  0.495  23,371 
                                            College  0.122  0.328  23,371 
Experience 22.219  11.720  23,371 
Female 0.392  0.488  23,371 
Married 0.669  0.471  23,371 
Job Turnover  2.030  1.473  19.024 
Tenure 14.058  10.552  18,693 
Overall Job Satisfaction  3.564  1.078  2,809 
Overall Quality of Life  78.826  19.389  3,636 
      
Notes.- Source SHIW 1993-2000. The description of the variables is in the Appendix. To 
save space, the table does not report summary statistics for the following variables: House 
location, Subjective house ratings, Job satisfaction Single Item Evaluations, and Elementary 






EFFECT OF CITY SIZE ON RENTS 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
      
City Size      
Large Villages  0.203***  0.136*** 0.135*** 
 (0.069)  (0.042)  (0.039) 
Small MAs  0.242***  0.240*** 0.232*** 
 (0.054)  (0.034)  (0.031) 
Midsize MAs  0.261***  0.294*** 0.293*** 
 (0.053)  (0.033)  (0.030) 
Large MAs  0.446***  0.500*** 0.494*** 
 (0.074)  (0.054)  (0.049) 
      
House Characteristics      
Surface Area in m2 (X100)  -  0.417*** 0.315*** 
   (0.020)  (0.016) 
Age of the House (X100)  -  -0.064*** -0.039*** 
   (0.008)  (0.007) 
Dummy for two Bathrooms  -  0.219***  0.159*** 
   (0.013)  (0.011) 
Dummy for Heating System  -  0.349***  0.199*** 
   (0.018)  (0.015) 
P-value for House’s Location  -  [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
      
Dummy for South  -  -0.305***  -0.282*** 
   (0.023)  (0.021) 
      
Subjective ratings      
P-value for House Rating  -  -  [0.0000] 
      
P-value for Location Rating  -  -  [0.0000] 
      
Intercept 8.213***  7.462*** 7.869*** 
 (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.061) 
Time dummies  YES  YES  YES 
      
R2   0.083  0.391  0.489 
N. Obs.  27,931  27,931  27,904 
      
Notes.- Source SHIW 1993-2000. The White robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses are corrected for the potential clustering of the residuals at the city 
level. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. *** (**) [*] denotes 






EFFECT OF CITY SIZE ON WAGES 
 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) 




       
City Size       
Large Villages  0.028  0.012  -  -  - 
 (0.024)  (0.019)       
Small MAs  0.055**  0.005  -  -  - 
 (0.022)  (0.017)       
Midsize MAs  0.092***  0.015 -0.061  -  - 
 (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.042)     
Large MAs  0.147***  0.026 -0.008  -  - 
 (0.026)  (0.019)  (0.071)     
Worker Characteristics       
Dummy for Junior High School  -  0.175***  0.162*** 0.037 0.036 
    (0.012) (0.016) (0.025) (0.041) 
Dummy for High School  -  0.457***  0.450*** 0.025 0.011 
    (0.017) (0.023) (0.031) (0.054) 
Dummy for College   -  0.814***  0.826*** -0.004 -0.021 
    (0.021) (0.030) (0.041) (0.065) 
Experience -  0.032***  0.031*** 0.001 0.001 
    (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Experience Squared (X100)  -  -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.002 -0.000 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) 
Dummy if Female  -  -0.087***  -0.086*** 0.014 -0.013 
   (0.008)  0.009  (0.014)  (0.023) 
Dummy if Married  -  0.081***  0.079*** 0.015 0.000 
   (0.008)  0.011  (0.016)  (0.023) 
Dummy for South  -  -0.088***  -0.100*** 0.029 0.034 
   (0.013)  0.017  (0.025)  (0.036) 
Intercept 2.334***  1.619*** 1.644*** -  - 
 (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.030)  -  - 
Time dummies  YES  YES  YES  -  - 
       
R2   0.04  0.40 
N. Obs.  23,371  23,371 
0.40 
23,371 
       
Notes.- Source SHIW 1993-2000. The White robust standard errors reported in parentheses are 
corrected for the potential clustering of the residuals at the city level. Regressions are weighted to 





EFFECT OF CITY SIZE ON JOB TURNOVER 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) 




          
City Size          
Large Villages  0.201***  0.161* -  -  - 
 (0.057)  (0.087)       
Small MAs  0.131**  0.155*  -  -  - 
 (0.052)  (0.085)       
Midsize MAs  0.145***  0.207** 0.036  -  - 
 (0.050)  (0.083)  (0.151)     
Large MAs  0.255***  0.287*** 0.165 -  - 
 (0.060)  (0.098)  (0.178)     
Worker Characteristics          
Dummy for Junior High 
School 
- -0.186***  -0.263*** 0.104 0.303** 
   (0.061)  (0.084)  (0.128)  (0.123) 
Dummy for High School  -  -0.437***  -0.452*** 0.102 -0.013 
   (0.068)  (0.092)  (0.133)  (0.168) 
Dummy for College   -  -0.604***  -0.720*** 0.291* 0.220 
   (0.076)  (0.112)  (0.169)  (0.168) 
Experience -  0.041***  0.044*** 0.000 -0.013 
   (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Experience Squared (X100)  -  -0.001*** -0.076*** -0.000 0.037*** 
   (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Dummy if Female  -  -0.366***  -0.425*** 0.081 0.220*** 
   (0.030)  (0.040)  (0.065)  (0.077) 
Dummy if Married  -  0.168***  0.247*** -0.208** -0.178* 
   (0.039)  (0.048)  (0.102)  (0.101) 
Dummy for South  -  -0.597***  -0.620*** 0.146 -0.075 
   (0.047)  (0.062)  (0.101)  (0.132) 
Intercept 1.949***  1.925*** 2.056*** -  - 
 (0.049)  (0.104)  (0.103)     
Time dummies  YES  YES  YES  -  - 
          
R2 0.01  0.10 
N. Obs.  19,024  19,024 
0.10 
19,024 
        
Notes.- Source: SHIW 1993-2000. The White robust standard errors reported in parentheses are 
corrected for the potential clustering of the residuals at the city level. Regressions are weighted 





EFFECT OF CITY SIZE ON TENURE 
 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) 




       
City Size       
Large  Villages  -0.724  -0.423  - - - 
  (0.660)  (0.445)     
Small  MAs  0.400  -0.370  - - - 
  (0.643)  (0.430)     
Midsize MAs  0.272  -0.495  0.008  -  - 
 (0.694)  (0.405)  (2.209)     
Large MAs  0.589  -0.765*  -2.368  -  - 
 (0.694)  (0.398)  (2.900)     
Worker Characteristics       
Dummy for Junior High School  -  1.385***  1.521*** -0.127 -0.914 
    (0.379) (0.488) (0.784) (1.046) 
Dummy for High School  -  1.038***  0.867* 0.164  0.485 
    (0.362) (0.475) (0.759) (0.903) 
Dummy for College   -  -1.032***  -0.869 -0.937 0.196 
    (0.399) (0.626) (0.896) (0.980) 
Age -  0.435***  0.448*** -0.042 0.091 
    (0.065) (0.092) (0.119) (0.163) 
Age Squared (X100)  -  0.390*** 0.364*** 0.075 -0.083 
    (0.085) (0.119) (0.155) (0.227) 
Dummy if Female  -  -0.159  0.189  -0.345  -1.439*** 
    (0.161) (0.216) (0.304) (0.410) 
Dummy if Married    0.687***  0.409 0.536 0.651 
  -  (0.235) (0.332) (0.449) (0.531) 
Dummy for South    0.232  0.277  0.280  -0.450 
  -  (0.257) (0.386) (0.519) (0.502) 
Intercept 12.631***  -10.788*** -11.162*** -  - 
 (0.567)  (1.316)  (1.695)     
Time dummies  YES  YES  YES  -  - 
       
R2 0.01  0.56 
N. Obs.  18,693  18,693 
0.57 
18,693 
       
Notes.- Source: SHIW 1993-2000. The White robust standard errors reported in parentheses are 
corrected for the potential clustering of the residuals at the city level. Regressions are weighted to 





EFFECT OF CITY SIZE ON OVERALL JOB SATISFACTION 
 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) 




       
City Size       
Large Villages  0.112  0.101  -  -  - 
 (0.140)  (0.147)       
Small MAs  0.087  0.069  -  -  - 
 (0.122)  (0.123)       
Midsize  MAs  0.041 0.022 0.174  -  - 
  (0.119) (0.123) (0.295)     
Large MAs  0.029  -0.014  0.160  -  - 
  (0.108) (0.114) (0.303)     
Worker Characteristics       
Dummy for Junior High School  -  0.116  0.157  0.025  -0.087 
    (0.103) (0.150) (0.190) (0.245) 
Dummy for High School  -  0.284***  0.365** -0.241  0.016 
    (0.108) (0.157) (0.218) (0.256) 
Dummy for College   -  0.278**  0.144  0.221  0.349 
    (0.139) (0.181) (0.262) (0.322) 
Experience  -  -0.012 -0.003 -0.022 -0.015 
    (0.010) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) 
Experience Squared (X100)  -  0.034  0.026  0.023  0.009 
    (0.021) (0.032) (0.047) (0.040) 
Dummy if Female  -  -0.018  0.051  -0.042  -0.250** 
    (0.055) (0.069) (0.119) (0.122) 
Dummy if Married  -  -0.038  -0.097  0.184  0.094 
    (0.081) (0.087) (0.153) (0.245) 
Dummy for South  -  -0.016  -0.101  0.233  0.197 
    (0.097) (0.131) (0.173) (0.167) 
Intercept 3.508***  3.422*** 3.339*** -  - 
  (0.104) (0.174) (0.196)     
       
R2 0.01  0.20 
N. Obs.  2,809  2,809 
0.22 
2,809 
       
Notes.- Source: SHIW 1995. The dependent variables is the respondent’s subjective evaluations 
(1=lowest satisfaction, 5=highest satisfaction) for Overall Job Satisfaction The White robust 
standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential clustering of the residuals at 
the city level. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. *** (**) [*] denotes significance 




   
Table 7 
 
EFFECT OF CITY SIZE ON JOB SATISFACTION: SINGLE ITEM EVALUATIONS   
 
 









College  Midsize MA 
and High 
School 




Large MA and 
College 
N. Obs 
           
Dependent Variables           
Environmental Conditions (Physical and Social)  0.115  -0.109  0.352*** 0.360*** -0.414**  0.114  0.060 0.424* 2,806 
  (0.252) (0.270) (0.108) (0.146) (0.184) (0.163) (0.231) (0.221)   
Dangerousness for Life or Health  0.110  -1.567*** -0.807*** -1.062*** 0.455* 0.908*** 0.229 1.016*** 2,808 
  (0.327) (0.369) (0.173) (0.202) (0.239) (0.293) (0.273) (0.338)   
Effort Required  0.258  -0.088  0.212*  0.141 -0.208  -0.019 0.058 0.130 2,811 
  (0.246) (0.317) (0.113) (0.143) (0.156) (0.284) (0.198) (0.296)   
Interestingness -0.106  -0.084  0.392*** 0.354**  -0.199  -0.080 0.252 0.110 2,810 
  (0.248) (0.230) (0.104) (0.161) (0.167) (0.173) (0.228) (0.188)   
Consideration by Others  0.364  0.842**  0.699*** 0.237 -0.555**  -0.803** 0.091  -0.143  2,804 
  (0.313) (0.378) (0.152) (0.204) (0.222) (0.358) (0.325) (0.451)   
Concern about Losing Your Employment  0.306  0.057  -0.762*** -0.722*** 0.095 0.022 -0.241  -0.259 2,808 
  (0.379) (0.316) (0.154) (0.195) (0.249) (0.292) (0.322) (0.358)   
           
           
Notes.- Source: SHIW 1995. The dependent variables are the respondent’s subjective evaluations (1=lowest satisfaction, 5=highest satisfaction) for 
the above single item evaluations of Job Satisfaction. The table reports regression results from the same specification as Table 6, Column (3). 
Regressions include also the following  (not reported) variables: Dummy for Junior High School; Experience; Experience Squared; Dummy if 
Female; Dummy if Married; Dummy for South; as well as their interactions with Dummy for Midsize MA and Dummy for Large MA. The White 
robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential clustering of the residuals at the city level. Regressions are weighted to 








EFFECT OF CITY SIZE ON OVERALL QUALITY OF LIFE 
 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) 




       
City Size       
Large Villages  -1.203  -2.047  -  -  - 
 (2.943)  (2.025)       
Small MAs  -8.392***  -4.656*** -  -  - 
 (2.723)  (1.836)       
Midsize MAs  -8.391***  -5.865*** 1.486 -  - 
 (2.804)  (1.854)  (9.930)     
Large MAs  -16.879***  -9.064*** -4.298** -  - 
 (3.752)  (2.217)  (2.050)     
Worker Characteristics       
Dummy for Junior High School  -  -0.898  -2.323  2.687  2.932 
    (1.230) (1.520) (2.690) (3.186) 
Dummy for High School  -  -2.585*  -4.274**  6.068**  6.191* 
    (1.350) (1.747) (2.964) (3.275) 
Dummy for College   -  -0.224  -2.907  6.064**  7.447** 
    (1.489) (2.100) (3.403) (3.438) 
Age  -  -0.339 -0.218 -0.523 -0.182 
    (0.230) (0.333) (0.481) (0.519) 
Age Squared (X100)  -  0.447  0.378  0.413  0.041 
    (0.283) (0.411) (0.590) (0.655) 
Dummy if Female  -  0.242  0.435  -0.840  -0.843 
    (0.627) (0.922) (1.233) (1.288) 
Dummy if Married  -  -1.684*  -4.329*** 7.007*** 6.378*** 
    (1.019) (1.509) (2.042) (2.354) 
Dummy for South  -  -18.376***  -16.303*** -6.872** -4.069 
    (1.485) (2.029) (3.244) (3.694) 
Intercept 84.164  99.078***  94.136***  -  - 
 (2.159)  (5.072)  (6.636)     
       
R2 0.10  0.30 
N. Obs.  3,636  3,636 
0.29 
3,636 
       
Notes.- Source: SHIW 1993. The dependent variables is the index of Overall Quality of Life, which 
is constructed by summing up the respondent’s subjective evaluations (1=lowest satisfaction, 
10=highest satisfaction) for the Elementary Indexes of Table 9 (with the exclusion of the University 
Index). The White robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential 
clustering of the residuals at the city level. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. *** 
(**) [*] denotes significance at the 1%  (5%) [10%] level. 
  
 
   
 
Table 9 
EFFECT OF CITY SIZE ON QUALITY OF LIFE: ELEMENTARY INDEXES 
Notes.- Source: SHIW 1995. The dependent variables are the respondent’s subjective evaluations (1=lowest satisfaction, 10=highest satisfaction) for the above components of 
Overall Quality of Life. The table reports regression results from the same specification as Table 8, Column (3). Regressions include also the following  (not reported) variables: 
Dummy for Junior High School; Experience; Experience Squared; Dummy if Female; Dummy if Married; Dummy for South; as well as their interactions with Dummy for 
Midsize MA and Dummy for Large MA. The White robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential clustering of the residuals at the city level.  
Regressions are weighted to population proportions. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1%  (5%) [10%] level. 









College  Midsize MA and 
High School 
Large MA and 
High School 
Midsize MA and 
College 
Large MA and 
College 
N. Obs 
Dependent Variables             
Public Transportation  0.844  -0.113  -0.103 -0.710* -0.420  0.330  0.248 1.004**  5,417 
 (1.290)  (1.570)  (0.230)  (0.369)  (0.335) (0.329) (0.454) (0.457)  
Health Services  0.623  -0.099  0.049  -0.190 -0.036 0.210 0.727*  0.877**  5,806 
 (1.101)  (1.633)  (0.222)  (0.300)  (0.311) (0.303) (0.385) (0.344)  
Local  Bureaucracy  0.852  -0.813 0.183 0.452* 0.156  0.442  0.170  0.383  5,838 
 (0.982)  (1.060)  (0.191)  (0.262)  (0.278) (0.334) (0.354) (0.401)  
Traffic Congestion  -0.473  -3.706*** -0.621* -0.288 0.524*  0.807*** 0.443 0.386  5,896 
  (1.281)  (1.263) (0.246) (0.371) (0.313) (0.289) (0.438) (0.474)  
Water Quality   0.959  0.885  -0.157  0.491  0.253 -0.140 -0.246 -0.437  5,897 
  (1.284)  (1.443) (0.277) (0.381) (0.355) (0.367) (0.492) (0.495)  
Nursery   -0.968  0.555  0.005  -0.447* 0.086  -0.158  0.746** 0.013  4,203 
  (1.020)  (1.770) (0.213) (0.274) (0.292) (0.443) (0.360) (0.513)  
Primary and Secondary School  0.007  -0.838 0.058 -0.336 0.066 -0.009  0.475**  0.554**  4,746 
  (0.881)  (1.205) (0.177) (0.235) (0.255) (0.354) (0.218) (0.252)  
Street  Cleaning  0.345  -1.259 0.209 -0.294 -0.038 0.569 0.150 0.744*  5,906 
  (0.920)  (0.946) (0.173) (0.231) (0.262) (0.352) (0.334) (0.428)  
Green  Areas  1.884*  -1.710  -0.136  -0.277 0.051 0.815 0.521 0.833  5,904 
  (1.135)  (2.091) ((0.236) (0.355) (0.327) (0.548) (0.454) (0.721)  
Safety and Crime Control  -0.793  -2.263**  -0.081  -0.042  0.365  0.567*  0.625*  0.570*  5,856 
  (1.022)  (1.094) (0.216) (0.245) (0.300) (0.321) (0.340) (0.342)  
Shopping Possibilities  2.273** -1.425  -0.368*  -0.363  0.739**  0.986*  0.940*** 1.180** 5,916 
  (1.045)  (1.332) (0.215) (0.251) (0.300) (0.578) (0.342) (0.596)  
Leisure Activities (Cinemas, Theaters, etc. )  2.860**  0.255  0.018  0.575**  0.159  0.979*** -0.051 1.132**  5,808 
  (1.260)  (1.558) (0.192) (0.293) (0.305) (0.337) (0.425) (0.502)  
Air Pollution  -2.268**  -3.990**  -0.085 -0.016 0.207 0.497 0.031 -0.034  5,914 
  (1.038)  (1.822) (0.307) (0.400) (0.381) (0.397) (0.480) (0.519)  
Noise Pollution  -1.597  -0.847  -0.820*** -0.487 1.038*** 1.080** 0.693*  0.643  5,908 
 (1.138)  (2.190)  (0.260)  (0.359)  (0.337) (0.420) (0.431) (0.428)  
Universities 0.952  1.713  -0.582  0.013  0.640 0.978* 0.014  0.702  1,694 




HIGH SCHOOL SHARE AND COLLEGE SHARE BY CITY SIZE 
 
Notes.- Source SHIW 1993-2000. The sample includes wage and salary workers of age between 
15 and 65. Observations are weighted to population proportions. 
 
College Share (left scale)





















 Description of the variables 
 
Variable Description 
Age of the house  Calculated as the difference between the year of the survey and the year the house was constructed, 
which is a data available from the SHIW. 
Bathrooms  Indicator variable equal to one if two or more bathrooms are available in the dwelling. 
City Size  Series of dummies for the resident population of the municipality: Villages (up to 5,000 inhabitants); 
Large Villages (from 5,000 to 20,000 inhabitants); Small MAs (from 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants); 
Midsize MAs (from 50,000 to 200,000 inhabitants); and Large MAs (more than 200,000 inhabitants). 
Educational achievement  Series of dummies for the worker’s educational qualification: elementary school (5 years of schooling) ; 
junior high school (8 years of schooling); high school (13 years of schooling); college (18 years or more 
of schooling).  
Experience  Calculated as the difference between worker’s age at the survey date and the age at first job held, which 
is a data available from the SHIW. 
Heating system  Indicator variable equal to one if an heating system is available in the dwelling. 
House’s location  Series of dummies for the location of the dwelling (isolated area, countryside; town outskirts; between 
outskirts and town center; town center; other; hamlet). 
Job Satisfaction  Respondent’s subjective evaluation (1=lowest satisfaction, 5=highest satisfaction). The question (posed 
only in the 1995 SHIW) was the following: “Apart from the economic aspects, how do you judge the 
overall satisfaction from your work?”. Respondents were then asked to provide a finer judgement of 
their satisfaction according to the following six criteria: environmental conditions (physical and 
social); dangerousness for life or health; effort required; interestingness; consideration by 
others; concern about losing your employment. 
Job Turnover  Number of work activities, including the temporary ones, performed in the worker’s lifetime.  
Quality of life  Respondent’s subjective evaluation (1=lowest satisfaction, 10=highest satisfaction. The question (posed 
only in the 1993 SHIW) was the following: “On the basis of your personal experience and the 
experience of your family member (please, refer to actual experience and not to what you might have 
read on newspaper) how would you rate your municipality for the following aspects of the quality of 
life: Public Transportation, Health Services, Universities, Local Bureaucracy, Traffic Congestion, 
Water Quality, Nursery, Primary and Secondary School, Street Cleaning, Green Areas, Safety and 
Crime Control, Shopping Possibilities, Leisure Activities, Air Pollution, Noise Pollution.” 
Rents  Log of the annual rent. For each household, the interviewed can be either the property owner or the 
tenant.  In the first case, the SHIW collects the rent the owner charges (or, if the dwelling is not rented 
or it is the family residence, her best estimate for the rent she could charge). In the second case, the 
tenant reports the actual rent paid. 
South  Indicator variable equal to one for the following Italian regions: Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, 
Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, and Sardegna. 
Subjective house rating  Series of dummies for the subjective (the survey asks “How do you rate this dwelling’”) rating of the 
dwelling (luxury; highly desirable; mid-range; modest; low-income; very low-income; rural; other). 
Subjective location rating  Series of dummies for the subjective (the survey asks “How would you rate the location where the 
dwelling is located?”) rating of the dwelling’s location (highly desirable; run-down; neither highly 
desirable nor run-down).  
Surface area  Area in square meters. 
Tenure  Number of years spent with the current employer 
Wages  Log of hourly wages. Hourly wages are calculated by dividing the annual earnings (from any activity as 
employee, including fringe benefits, net of taxes and social security contributions) by the total amount 
of hours worked in a year (Average Hours Worked per Week × Months Worked × 4.3333). The sample 











Trieste; Bologna; Bari; Catania; Firenze; Genova; Taranto; Venezia; Messina; Napoli; Palermo; Padova; Verona; 




Acireale; Afragola; Agrigento; Alessandria; Altamura; Ancona; Andria; Aprilia; Arezzo; Ascoli Piceno; Asti; 
Avellino; Aversa; Barletta; Benevento; Bergamo; Bisceglie; Bitonto; Bolzano – Bozen; Brescia; Brindisi; Busto 
Arsizio; Cagliari; Caltanissetta; Campobasso; Carpi; Carrara; Caserta; Casoria; Castellammare di Stabia; 
Catanzaro; Cava de' Tirreni; Cerignola; Cesena; Chieti; Chioggia; Cinisello Balsamo; Civitavecchia; Cologno 
Monzese; Como; Cosenza; Cremona; Crotone; Cuneo; Ercolano; Faenza; Fano; Ferrara; Foggia; Foligno; Forlì; 
Gela; Giugliano in Campania; Grosseto; Guidonia Montecelio; Imola; La Spezia; Lamezia Terme; L'Aquila; 
Latina; Lecce; Legnano; Livorno; Lucca; Manfredonia; Marsala; Massa; Matera; Mazara del Vallo; Modena; 
Modica; Molfetta; Moncalieri; Monza; Novara; Parma; Pavia; Perugia; Pesaro; Pescara; Piacenza; Pisa; Pistoia; 
Pordenone; Portici; Potenza; Pozzuoli; Prato; Quartu Sant'Elena; Ragusa; Ravenna; Reggio di Calabria; Reggio 
nell'Emilia; Rho; Rimini; Rivoli; Rovigo; Salerno; San Giorgio a Cremano; San Remo; San Severo; Sassari; 
Savona; Scandicci; Sesto San Giovanni; Siena; Siracusa; Teramo; Terni; Tivoli; Torre del Greco; Trani; Trapani; 
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